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Subprime Lending/
Foreclosure Crisis
JACOB S. RUGH
Brigham Young University, USA

Subprime mortgage lending in the USA is
marked by its short and costly history that
ended with a foreclosure crisis in which
several million borrowers lost their homes
and trillions of dollars of household wealth.
The advent of subprime lending in the early
1990s was initially understood as a product
of innovations like risk-based pricing, automated underwriting, and credit scoring that
would expand access to credit and homeownership. Designed to meet the needs of
borrowers whose credit scores fell below a
certain threshold, subprime loans featured a
higher interest rate to compensate lenders for
higher risk of default. As subprime lending
grew, estimates of the fraction of subprime
borrowers eligible for prime loans rose from
10 to 35 percent in the early 1990s, to 30 to
50 percent in 2003, and 50 to 62 percent by
2006 (Mahoney and Zorn 1996; Brooks and
Simon 2007).
After increasing from $11 billion in 1994
to close to $900 billion in 2006, subprime
lending met its abrupt end in August 2007
(Figure 1). As subprime mortgage defaults
skyrocketed, international markets for subprime securities seized up, primarily due to
the lack of knowledge of counterparty risk
bound up in opaque financial instruments
built from bundles of subprime loans. The
financial collapse sparked the worst foreclosure crisis since the Great Depression. By
2009, the subprime crisis had transformed
and was driven by defaults largely on prime

mortgages, due to tumbling home values and
rising unemployment, which according to the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics doubled from
4.6 percent to 10 percent in less than two
years. The share of mortgages in foreclosure
or 90 days past due multiplied six-fold from
1.6 percent in 2006 to 9.5 percent in 2010
(Figure 1). Between 2007 and 2012 there
were 9–12 million foreclosure filings and
4–5 million completed foreclosures (Hall,
Crowder, and Spring 2015). US households
lost an estimated $16 trillion in net worth
in the crisis and conservative estimates peg
the cost of the Great Recession at $6–14
trillion. The rest of this entry considers the
economic, social, and historical roots of the
short-lived era of subprime mortgage lending
and the effectiveness of policy responses to
the foreclosure crisis.
Economic research isolates the house price
bubble as the primary cause of the foreclosure
crisis. From 1996 to 2006, real home prices
grew by roughly 125 percent and then fell
38 percent by 2011 before recovering in 2012
(Figure 1). Other explanations – resets of
adjustable mortgage rates, creditworthiness,
low interest rates/excess credit, overbuilding,
and government homeownership initiatives – have not withstood scrutiny or have
been demonstrated to be secondary (e.g.,
household indebtedness, deterioration in
underwriting standards, or principal–agent
conflicts in the primary and secondary mortgage markets). To give one example, studies
have dismissed the notion that federal regulations requiring lenders to extend credit
to low and moderate income areas (e.g., the
1977 Community Reinvestment Act) could
have caused the subprime foreclosure crisis.
The main reason (one of several) that this
explanation has faltered is due to the fact
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that over 90 percent of subprime loans were
originated by lenders not subject to such
federal oversight (see Avery and Brevoort
2011 for a review). Palmer (2015) finds that
about 60 percent of differences in default rates
are due to home price changes, 30 percent to
the shift to riskier loan characteristics over
time, and less than 10 percent due to other
factors. Ding et al. (2011) emphasize that
subprime foreclosures were due more to a
shift to risky products than risky borrowers.
In sum, economic research has eliminated
several spurious theories of the crisis but
failed to address why the house price bubble
arose in the first place. Moreover, this line
of research focused on causes does not adequately explain the uneven distribution of
subprime lending and the consequences of
the foreclosure crisis across social categories,
especially race.

Early scholarship strongly suggested that
disproportionate subprime lending to black
and Latino borrowers and neighborhoods
was not explained by differences in income,
education, and property values. More recent
studies that control for credit scores, down
payment ratios, and other variables confirm racial disparities in high cost subprime
lending. According to national estimates by
Reid et al. (2017), even among with those
with higher credit scores, black and Latino
borrowers were more likely than white borrowers to receive a higher priced subprime
loan. These disparities in subprime lending
led to large disparities in foreclosure. Reid
et al. (2017) report that 23 percent of Latino
households, 19 percent of black households,
11 percent of Asian households, and 9 percent
of white households completed foreclosure as
of early 2013.
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In contrast to most work in economics,
scholarship in urban history, geography,
law, and sociology has tended to emphasize
the interaction of race and space across
the history of institutional exclusion and
exploitation in explanations of the rise of subprime lending and the social distribution of
the foreclosures crisis. This scholarship posits
spatial segregation as the connection between
past exclusion and contemporary exploitation. First, exclusionary mortgage redlining
by federal interventions into the housing
market in the New Deal era institutionalized
racial segregation and racial segmentation of
a dual housing market. Exclusionary practices racialized space and reduced levels and
returns to wealth accrued from home equity
in segregated communities that compounded
racial inequality across generations of
nonwhite neighborhoods, families, and individuals. Research has demonstrated that the
experience of black middle-class homeowners
has not been equivalent to white middle-class
homeowners. The neighborhood income
of middle-class black households earning
$50,000 is lower than that of poor white
households earning $20,000 (Reardon, Fox,
and Townsend 2015). These disparities in
neighborhood context are largest in the
most segregated cities. Faber (2013) finds
that, net of other factors, rates of subprime
lending decrease for white homeowners as
their incomes rise, but increase with incomes
among black homeowners. A recent study
based on one of the largest civil rights settlements of accusations of discriminatory
subprime lending finds that black households
with incomes over $50,000 were estimated
to be charged 6 percent more in loan rates
($19,000 in payments over the life of a 30-year
loan) than whites with similar incomes, credit
scores, down payments, and other characteristics (Rugh, Albright, and Massey 2015).
The second explanation for racial disparities in subprime lending and foreclosure
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rates emphasizes the spatial connection
between redlining, segregation, and racial
segmentation. Instead of credit exclusion,
segregation serves as the basis for the targeting of segmented subprime credit to
neighborhoods of color. Spatial segregation
by race has been shown to structure market
and economic outcomes like employment
and poverty independent of individual factors, such as income, family structure, and
education (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Massey
and Denton 1993; Sharkey 2013). Empirical
research documents how racial residential
segregation directly structured the causes
and consequences of the foreclosure crisis
by concentrating both subprime loans and
subsequent foreclosures in communities of
color (Hwang, Hankinson, and Brown 2015;
Hyra et al. 2013; Rugh and Massey 2010).
Indirectly, distant federal housing interventions also structured inequality in
subprime lending and foreclosures. Recent
sociological work on the US political
economy by Krippner (2011) and Prasad
(2013) sharpens the connection by showing how social arrangements hardwired in
early-twentieth-century laws and policies
inherently led to inequalities in access to
credit that in turn begat increasing reliance
on mortgage debt. The early establishment of
mortgage credit shaped later expansion as a
right for black Americans, communities of
color (Community Reinvestment Act), and
women (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) in
the 1970s. Bipartisan financial deregulation
of the 1980s and a shared social consensus
of homeownership combined with advances
in underwriting, credit-scoring technology,
risk-based pricing, and securitization in the
1990s to make the USA fertile for the growth
of subprime lending. In the end, subprime
lending did not narrow, but instead widened,
inequalities in homeownership. The balance
of defaults and foreclosures outweighed
any remaining increase in ownership due to
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subprime loans before the foreclosure crisis hit
(Demyanyk and Kolb 2010). Recent evidence
based on longitudinal data strongly suggests
that the era of subprime lending destabilized
homeownership, particularly among black
households (Sharp and Hall 2014).
Federal interventions designed to protect
neighborhoods and homeowners against
the impact of the foreclosure crisis tended
to exacerbate the disparate impact of the
crisis by race, space, and class. Nearly all
took place after the crisis shifted from subprime to prime mortgages in 2009, were
too modest in scale, and were concentrated
among borrowers who remained in their
homes until home prices rebounded in 2011
to 2013. At the community level, the federal
Neighborhood Stabilization Program met its
target of approximately 100,000 properties;
yet, its modest scale (roughly 2–3 percent
of all completed foreclosures) and delays in
implementation reduced its impact (Fraser
and Oakley 2015; Immergluck 2015; Schuetz
et al. 2015). The US Treasury launched several
programs to modify mortgages of troubled
homeowners but most remained limited to
hardest hit states, second mortgages, the
unemployed, or refinances of prime mortgages already held by government sponsored
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(Immergluck 2015). From 2009 through 2013
the universal Home Affordable Modification
Program recorded 927,000 active permanent loan modifications; about one in nine
included reduction of mortgage principal and
the typical reduction was $67,000 (US Treasury Department 2014). In contrast, after 49
states settled with major private loan servicers
for improper foreclosure practices in 2012,
these servicers modified 393,000 mortgages
in one year alone; moreover, 1 in 4 reduced
principal balances, by an average of $110,000
(Center for Responsible Lending 2013).
By the end of the crisis, foreclosure rates
were highest in black areas in the Midwest and

northeast, and even higher in predominantly
Latino and racially integrated neighborhoods
in the south and west (Hall, Crowder, and
Spring 2015). One major research challenge to
the literature on the distribution of subprime
lending and foreclosure crisis is to examine
more closely the role of region, location,
immigration, and other demographic factors
(Rugh and Hall 2016). Another challenge
is to understand better the causes of house
price bubbles to better contain the impact
of the collapse of the next one. Despite the
recovery in home values since 2012, several
consequences of the foreclosure crisis remain
clear: homeownership rates are the lowest
in almost a generation, wealth gaps by race
and class are wider than they were before
the crisis, millions of home loans have gone
missing, reform of mortgage finance is very
unlikely, and rules to safeguard consumer
protections still hang in the balance.
SEE ALSO: Housing; Housing Policy; Spatial
Segregation
REFERENCES
Avery, Robert B., and Kenneth P. Brevoort. 2011.
The Subprime Crisis: Is Government Housing
Policy to Blame? Federal Reserve Board Working Paper 2011-36. Washington, DC: Federal
Reserve Board.
Brooks, Rick, and Ruth Simon. 2007. “Subprime
Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: As
Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a
Broader Market.” Wall Street Journal, December
3: A1.
Center for Responsible Lending. 2013. “Analysis of Recent Reports from the Monitor
of the National Mortgage Settlement.”
Accessed on February 5, 2018, at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/
policy-legislation/2013-crl-analysis-finalmonitor-report-on-ag-settlement-correctedsept-19final.pdf.
Cutler, David M., and Edward L. Glaeser. 1997.
“Are Ghettos Good or Bad?” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112(3): 827–872.

SU BPRIME LENDING/FORECLOSURE CRISIS

Demyanyk, Yuliya, and Robert W. Kolb. 2010. “Ten
Myths about Subprime Mortgages.” In Lessons
from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences,
and Our Economic Future, edited by Robert W.
Kolb, 87–93. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Ding, Lei, Roberto G. Quercia, Wei Li, and Janneke
Ratcliffe. 2011. “Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages: Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity
Score Models.” Journal of Real Estate Research,
33(2): 245–276.
Faber, Jacob. 2013. “Racial Dynamics of Subprime
Mortgage Lending at the Peak.” Housing Policy
Debate, 23(2): 328–349.
Fraser, James, and Deirdre Oakley. 2015. “The
Neighborhood Stabilization Program: Stable for
Whom?” Journal of Urban Affairs, 37(1): 38–41.
DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12159.
Hall, Matthew, Kyle Crowder, and Amy Spring.
2015. “Variations in Housing Foreclosures by
Race and Place, 2005–2012.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 660(1): 217–237.
Hwang, Jackelyn, Michael Hankinson, and Kreg
Steven Brown. 2014. “Racial and Spatial Targeting: Segregation and Subprime Lending within
and across Metropolitan Areas.” Social Forces,
93(3): 1081–1108. DOI: 10.1093/sf/sou099.
Hyra, Derek S., Gregory D. Squires, Robert N.
Renner, and David S. Kirk. 2013. “Metropolitan
Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis,”
Housing Policy Debate, 23(1): 177–198.
Immergluck, Dan. 2015. Preventing the Next Mortgage Crisis: The Meltdown, the Federal Response,
and the Future of Housing in America. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Inside Mortgage Finance. 2008. Mortgage Yearbook
for 2007: Market Trends and Industry Leaders in
the Residential Mortgage Business and MBS Markets. Bethesda, MD: Inside Mortgage Finance.
Krippner, Greta R. 2011. Capitalizing on Crisis: The
Political Origins of the Rise of Finance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mahoney, Peter E., and Peter M. Zorn. 1996.
“The Promise of Automated Underwriting.” Secondary Mortgage Markets, November: 18–23.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993.
American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Palmer, Christopher J. “Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default during the Crisis:

5

Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices?” Accessed
on February 5, 2018, at http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/palmer/cpalmer-subprime.pdf.
Prasad, Monica. 2013. Land of Too Much: American
Abundance and the Paradox of Poverty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reardon, Sean, Lindsay Fox, and Joseph
Townsend. 2015. “Neighborhood Income
Composition by Household Race and Income,
1990–2000.” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 660(1): 78–97.
Reid, Carolina, Debbie Bocian, Wei Li, and
Roberto G. Quercia. 2017. “Revisiting the Subprime Crisis: The Dual Mortgage Market and
Mortgage Defaults by Race and Ethnicity.” Journal of Urban Affairs, 39(4): 469–487. DOI:
0.1080/07352166.2016.1255529.
Rugh, Jacob S., Len Albright, and Douglas S.
Massey. 2015. “Race, Space, and Cumulative
Disadvantage: A Case Study of the Subprime
Mortgage Collapse.” Social Problems, 62(2):
186–218. DOI: 10.1093/socpro/spv002.
Rugh, Jacob S., and Matthew Hall. 2016. “Deporting the American Dream: Immigration Enforcement and Latino Foreclosures.” Sociological
Science, 3: 1053–1076. DOI: 10.15195/v3.a46.
Rugh, Jacob S., and Douglas S. Massey. 2010. “Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure
Crisis.” American Sociological Review, 75(5):
629–651. DOI: 10.1177/0003122410380868.
Schuetz, Jenny, Jonathan Spader, Jennifer Lewis
Buell, Kimberly Burnett, Larry Buron, Alvaro
Cortes, Michael DiDomenico, Anna Jefferson,
Christian Redfearn, and Stephen Whitlow. 2015.
“Investing in Distressed Communities: Outcomes from the Neighborhood Stabilization
Program.” Cityscape, 17(2): 279–306.
Sharkey, Patrick. 2013. Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress Toward Racial
Equality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Sharp, Gregory, and Matthew Hall. 2014. “Emerging Forms of Racial Inequality in Homeownership Exit, 1968–2009.” Social Problems, 61(3):
427–447.
US Treasury Department. 2014. “December 2013
Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report.” Accessed on February 5, 2018, at
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/reports/Documents/December%2020
13%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf.

6

SU BPRIME LENDING/FORECLOSURE CRISIS

FURTHER READING
Bocian, Debbie Gruenstein, Wei Li, Carolina Reid,
and Roberto G. Quercia. 2011. Lost Ground,
2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and
Foreclosures. Washington, DC: Center for
Responsible Lending.
Engel, Kathleen C., and Patricia A. McCoy. 2011.
Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Foote, Christopher L., Kristopher S. Gerardi,
and Paul S. Willen. 2012. “Why Did So
Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad
Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure
Crisis.” Paper presented at Russell Sage Foundation Conference, Rethinking Finance:
New Perspectives on the Crisis, New York,
April 13.

Hernández, Jesus. 2009. “Redlining Revisited:
Mortgage Lending Patterns in Sacramento
1930–2004.” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, 33: 291–313.
Immergluck, Dan. 2011. Foreclosed: High-Risk
Lending, Deregulation, and the Undermining of
America’s Mortgage Market, 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Williams, Richard, Reynold Nesiba, and Eileen
Diaz McConnell. 2005. “The Changing Face of
Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending.” Social
Problems, 52(2): 181–208.
Wyly, Elvin K., Mona Atia, Holly Foxcroft, Daniel
J. Hammel, and Kelly Phillips-Watts. 2006.
“American Home: Predatory Mortgage Capital
and Neighbourhood Spaces of Race and Class
Exploitation in the United States.” Geografiska
Annaler, 88: 105–132.

